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We examine the effect of earned participation rewards on willingness to pay
(WTP) bids in experimental auctions. Our results show that when subjects
are provided with a fixed reward, they bid more than those who had to earn
their reward.
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I. Introduction
Owing to the strong evidence that individuals overstate
their true willingness to pay (WTP) in hypothetical
situations, there has recently been increased interest in
measuring WTP using experimental auctions (Lusk
and Shogren, 2007). These mechanisms have the strong
advantages of being incentive-compatible and replicate
real-life settings, since they involve real goods and
money (Drichoutis et al., 2008). On the other hand,
experimental auction designs are built upon several
methodological choices that inherently have a number
of limitations. While there is extensive literature on the
effects of experimental design issues, such as auction
mechanism (Lusk et al., 2007), initial endowments
(Corrigan and Rousu, 2006a) and practice rounds
(Brown, 2005), there has been surprisingly little atten-
tion paid to the effect participation rewards might have
on experimental auction results. Therefore, the objec-
tive of this study was to empirically assess the effect of
earned participation rewards on WTP bids in experi-
mental auctions.
II. The Experiment
Following Depositario et al. (2009), participants were
recruited among undergraduate students in the city of
Naples, South of Italy. The only requirements were to
be aUniversity student and a regular yogurt consumer
(between daily and bi-weekly user).
The data were collected in the winter of 2012.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
treatments: the control (in which the show-up fee was
automatically provided) and the other treatment, in
which the fee was earned. Subjects participated in ses-
sions, which varied from 12 to 15 students. In total, 10
sessions were held and 132 subjects participated in our
study. The experiment was programmed and con-
ducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Sessions were held in the morning, which is a common
consumption time for yogurt; each session lasted
approximately 1 hour to 1 hour and 15 minutes.
During the session, consisting of five rounds, parti-
cipants had to bid for three different types of yogurts: a
conventional, a functional and an organic (presented in
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a standard sale package, with two servings). In the
treatment group, consisting of five sessions, individuals
had an opportunity to increase their participation
reward of 5E through a questionnaire game composed
of ten questions on different topics (such as history,
geography and mathematics). Half a euro was gained
for every correct answer. In the control group, also
consisting of five sessions, participants did not take
part in the game, and randomly received rewards ran-
ging from E5 to E10. The five sessions with the ques-
tionnaire game were held first, and we used the results
to determine the distribution of payouts on the control
group (the exact same 66 rewards’ values resulting from
the game were distributed to the second group of parti-
cipants, mean = 6.88, SD = 1.34).
Using the Pearson chi-square test, we ascertained
that the groups were not significantly different from
each other (in terms of yogurt consumption frequency,
gender, age and household composition). We used the
fifth-price Vickrey auction in order to elicit consumers’
WTP. The choice of the fifth highest bid makes it
possible to increase the number of participants in the
transaction, and hence to increase the degree of invol-
vement in the auction of those individuals who attri-
bute low values to the products on sale. As noted by
Lusk et al. (2004), this type of auction combines the
advantages of second-price and random nth-price
auctions. In addition, Lusk et al. (2007) demonstrated
that if the number of participants who could purchase
the product is approximately half the session, all bid-
ders would generally be more engaged. No reference
price was given to respondents since previous scholars
have demonstrated that provision of reference or field
price information influences bid values in experimental
auctions (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006b; Drichoutis
et al., 2008). In the training auctions, with University
gadgets, we posted prices to explain the auction
mechanism, but during the yogurt auctions, we did
not reveal any bidding information. We made it clear
to the subjects that only one round and one product
will be binding, to avoid demand reductions and wealth
effects.
III. Empirical Results
Table 1 shows the differences between WTP means
and medians of the two treatments for the three
types of yogurt. Subjects who received fixed, non-
earned rewards reveal significantly higher WTP for
all the auctioned products.
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates of random
effects Tobit models, where the dependent variable is
participant i’s WTP for each yogurt in the presence and
Table 1. Average WTP differences between treatment and control and Wilcoxon signed-rank test
Wilcoxon signed-rank test Mean Median SD p
 Conventional yogurt Nonearned reward – Earned reward 0.49 0.4 0.91 ,0.001
 Organic yogurt Nonearned reward – Earned reward 0.56 0.5 1.07 ,0.001
 Functional yogurt Nonearned reward – Earned reward 0.65 1.0 1.36 ,0.001
Table 2. Random-effects Tobit model estimates: WTP for yogurts (N= 132)
Conventional yogurt Organic yogurt Functional yogurt
Variables Parameter p Parameter p Parameter p
Constant 0.181 0.142 0.098 0.185 0.219 0.108
Random vs. Earned rewarda 0.318** 0.000 0.397** 0.001 0.411** 0.000
Round 2 0.244** 0.001 0.276** 0.000 0.308 0.000
Round 3 0.263** 0.000 0.288** 0.001 0.314** 0.002
Round 4 0.269** 0.000 0.302** 0.001 0.321** 0.001
Round 5 0.274** 0.000 0.296** 0.000 0.337** 0.000
Ageb 0.212 0.332 0.248 0.109 0.315 0.000
Female 0.143 0.089 0.262 0.183 0.321 0.123
Yogurt consumption frequencyc 0.326** 0.003 0.139** 0.002 0.214** 0.002
SD of individual-specific error 0.721** 0.004
Likelihood ratio test that s(u) = 0 5033.26**
Note: a0 = subjects earned money through the questionnaire game, 1 = randomly assigned reward.
bage is a dummy where 0=between 18 and 24 years old, 1=over 24.
cdummy 0 = low consumption frequency, 1 = high consumption frequency.
**significant at 0.01 level.






































the absence of an earned reward. Consistent with the
results from Table 1, we find that randomly assigned
rewards have a positive and statistically significant
impact on bids in all models, suggesting that the way
rewards are distributed affects value estimates.
We specifically model WTP as: WTPi = f (Randomly
assigned fixed Reward, Round 2, Round 3, Round 4,
Round 5, Age, Gender, Yogurt consumption fre-
quency) per i= 1, 2, . . . 132.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Paying experimental subjects a participation fee to
reward their opportunity cost is a common practice
in experimental economics. Previous research has
investigated the importance of earned remuneration
in dictator games, concluding that earned money is
considered differently to windfall gains (Cherry et al.,
2002; List and Cherry, 2008). In this study, we
explored the issue of earned rewards in the fifth-price
Vickrey auctions. We conclude that when subjects are
provided randomly with a fixed reward, compared to
a reward earned through a questionnaire game, they
tend to bid more for the auctioned products.
Consequently, a critical implication of our finding is
the importance of addressing the issue of earned
rewards in experimental auctions that elicit home-
grown values. This is highly relevant if results of auc-
tion experiments should be transferred to predict
actual purchase decisions at the market, therefore
reward mechanisms should also be considered as an
important feature in planning experimental design.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Prof. Jason L. Lusk
for his helpful inputs in designing the experiment and
valuable suggestions and comments on a previous
version of the paper. The authors assume full respon-
sibility for any remaining errors.
References
Brown, T. C. (2005) Loss aversion without the endowment
effect, and other explanations for the WTA-WTP dis-
parity, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
57, 367–79.
Cherry, T., Frykblom, P. and Shogren, J. F. (2002)
Hardnose the dictator, American Economic Review,
92, 1218–21.
Corrigan, J. and Rousu, M. (2006a) The effect of initial
endowments in experimental auctions, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88, 448–57.
Corrigan, J. R. and Rousu, M. C. (2006b) Posted prices and
bid affiliation: evidence from experimental auctions,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88,
1078–90.
Depositario, D., Nayga Jr, R., Wu, X. and Laude, T. (2009)
Should students be used as subjects in experimental
auctions?, Economics Letters, 102, 122–24.
Drichoutis, A., Lazaridis, P. and Nayga, R. M. (2008). The
role of reference prices in experimental auctions,
Economics Letters, 99, 446–48.
Fischbacher, U. (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-
made economic experiments, Experimental Economics,
10, 171–78.
List, J. A. and Cherry,T. L. (2008) Examining the role of
fairness in high stakes allocation decisions, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 1–8.
Lusk, J., Feldkamp, T. and Schroeder. T. (2004)
Experimental auction procedure: impact on valuation
of quality differentiated goods, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 86, 389–405.
Lusk, J. L., Alexander, C. and Rousu M. C. (2007)
Designing experimental auctions for marketing
research: the effect of values, distributions, and
mechanisms on incentives for truthful bidding, Review
of Marketing Science, 5, Article 3.
Lusk, J. L. and Shogren, J. F.(2007) Experimental
Auctions: Methods and Applications in Economic and
Marketing Research, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
1300 R. Vecchio and E. Pomarici
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ipa
rtm
en
to 
di 
St
ud
i E
 R
eic
erc
he
], 
[R
icc
ard
o V
ec
ch
io]
 at
 01
:52
 02
 Ju
ly 
20
13
 
